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A complete calculus of inductive inference captures the totality of facts about 
inductive support within some domain of propositions as relations or theorems within 
the calculus. It is demonstrated that there can be no complete, non-trivial calculus of 
inductive inference. 
1.	  Introduction	  
 In informal accounts of inductive inference, we may say that the evidence strongly 
supports some scientific theory. Just how strong is “strong”? We may say that simpler or more 
explanatory hypotheses deserve greater inductive support. But how can we justify this when we 
are barely able to say just what is it to explain or to be simple? 
 Formal approaches to inductive inference hold the promise of a mechanical solution to 
such conundrums. It lies in the enticing ideal of a complete inductive calculus. In it, strengths of 
inductive support would be represented numerically; and their magnitudes would be fixed by the 
explicit rules of some calculus that render their determination a matter of mechanical 
computation. Then all relations of inductive support in some domain, as well as all general facts 
                                                
1 I am grateful for helpful discussion especially to Wayne Myrvold and to Yann Benétreau-
Dupin, Greg Gandenberger, Paul Teller, Jim Woodward and the Fellows of the Center for 
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about them, would be captured fully as relations and theorems within that calculus. 
 Such a calculus could, for example, capture the totality of all inductive relations of support 
that ground our present science in a single, enormous computation. The actual computation 
would, of course, be prohibitively complicated. No one should expect that it could be written 
down in any fashion tractable to us. However its possibility in principle would be of the highest 
foundational importance. It would mean that all specific facts about the inductive support of 
some particular proposition on some particular body of evidence could be captured as relations 
fully derivable within the calculus; and all general facts about inductive inference would be 
reducible to theorems in the applicable calculus. The foundational puzzles of inductive inference 
would yield eventually and inexorably to the display of suitable theorems. The conundrums of 
philosophical analysis would have been replaced by the mechanics of theorem proving. 
 Call this all-embracing capacity of a quantitative calculus its “inductive completeness.” 
What will be demonstrated here is that there can be no inductively complete calculus. The result 
pertains to no particular calculus of inductive inference, but to the prospects of a broad class of 
them to be characterized below. The class includes the probability calculus favored by the 
Bayesians. 
 The demonstration requires assumptions. The two most important are these: 
 First, the requirement of completeness is implemented as a requirement that the inductive 
logic draw only on resources within the compass of the propositions at issue. No external 
judgments of strengths of inductive support can be used, for they would lie outside the inductive 
scrutiny of the logic. Since those internal resources are just the deductive relations among the 
propositions, the inductive logic is required to be “deductively definable.” That is, the strengths 
of inductive support are defined either explicitly or implicitly in terms of the deductive relations 
(i.e. “what deductively entails what”) over the algebra of propositions at issue. An illustration of 
an implicit definition of this type is the defining of probability measures through Kolmogorov 
type axioms, supplemented with further propositions that fix the probabilities. This condition, 
and the symmetry theorem derived from it, are developed in Sections 3 and 4. 
 Second it is assumed that the logic is “asymptotically stable.” This condition responds to 
the possibility of refining, that is, expanding, the algebra of propositions by disjunction. The 
proposition that there will be a solar eclipse on June 1st can be replaced by the disjunction of 
propositions asserting a solar eclipse on the morning of June 1st or on the afternoon of June 1st. 
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The strength of support afforded to some fixed proposition by some fixed evidence may be 
altered by the refinement. The presumption of asymptotic stability is that this strength of support 
converges towards a unique limit that is the best representation of the strength of support; and 
that all continuing refinements eventually become inductively inert hair-splitting that does not 
disrupt the approach to this unique limit. This condition is developed in Section 5. 
 The no-go result, developed in Sections 6, is that any inductive logic satisfying these two 
conditions and an additional continuity condition reduces to a trivial logic in which the inductive 
strengths of support converge to a single value. 
 In barest form, the proof depends on the fact that a deductively definable logic of induction 
is adapted to a deductive structure that is highly symmetric, so that the inductive structure 
inherits all its symmetries. These symmetries render the inductive logic unable to discern that 
continued disjunctive refinement eventually becomes inductive hair-splitting. Instead, its 
inductive strengths keep responding in inconsistent ways to different refinements and fail to 
stabilize, unless the logic is trivial. The strategy of the demonstration is akin to the familiar use 
of the principle of indifference to show that there can be no neutral prior probability distribution. 
That strategy is amplified here greatly and applied not just to prior strengths of support, but to all 
strengths of support and the rules of the logics themselves. 
 Section 8 reviews various escapes intended to preserve the possibility of a complete 
calculus of inductive inference. Among them is the possibility of escape through subjective 
Bayesianism, where inductive inferences are embedded in a larger context of the dynamics of 
belief states. While the possibility of arbitrarily chosen prior beliefs breaks the symmetry central 
to the no-go result, the escape fails since the problems driving the no-go result reappear in a 
different guise. Similarly, escapes by designating preferred refinements or preferred languages 
amount to a failure of completeness, for inductive considerations outside the domain must 
determine which partitions or languages should be preferred. 
 The main significance of this analysis is explored in Section 7. It is that inductive logic 
cannot be reduced to a single mathematical calculus. Any non-trivial calculus is incomplete and 
a non-trivial application is possible only if one introduces additional inductive content that 
comes from outside the calculus and is therefore beyond the scope of its inductive scrutiny. This 
additional content may manifest as a need to stipulate sensible Bayesian prior probabilities 
through external consideration or in a failure of a novel calculus to accommodate all problems. 
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These difficulties are misdiagnosed as temporary nuisances, such as the “problem of the priors,” 
while they are really manifestations of an ineliminable foundational problem. 
 In a much quoted passage, De Finetti (1938, 194) proclaimed the reduction of inductive 
reasoning to probability theory: 
…one must invert the roles of inductive reasoning and probability theory: it is the 
latter that has autonomous validity, whereas induction is the derived notion. One is 
thus led to conclude with Poincaré that “whenever we reason by induction we make 
more or less conscious use of the calculus of probabilities.” 
The import of the results of this paper is that this reduction of induction to probability, or to any 
other of a broadly defined class of calculi, cannot be achieved completely. We cannot answer the 
question of “what is inductive inference?” with “ It is merely inference governed by such and 
such a calculus.” 
 Most of the literature seeks to show what an inductive calculus can do, not what it cannot 
do. Thus these sorts of incompleteness results are relatively rare. For one that developed into the 
learning theoretic paradigm, see Putnam (1963) and its extensively developed versions in Kelly 
(1996, especially Ch. 13). Closer to this paper, Titelbaum (2010, 2011) has extended Goodman-
grue like considerations to a permutation symmetry among predicates in an unquantified 
predicate logic. He argues that the symmetry precludes a purely syntactic relation in which 
hypothesis h1 is favored over hypothesis h2 by evidence e. 
 The results to be discussed extend those developed in a simpler form in Norton (2010) for a 
different purpose. The goal of the present paper is to give a full statement of the incompleteness 
and its proof, with emphasis on the technical details. Further interpretive remarks, a simplified 
encapsulation and discussion of the significance of the incompleteness can be found in Norton 
(2015).  
2.	  The	  Deductive	  Structure	  
2.1	  Finite	  Boolean	  Algebras	  of	  Propositions	  
 An inductive calculus defines relations of inductive support over some set of 
propositions, connected by deductive relations. We shall proceed with the simple case of the 
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sentential logic of arbitrarily many, but only finitely many, non-compounded propositions. This 
simple logic will suffice for the no-go result. (See Section 8.1 for further discussion.) That is, we 
consider finitely many propositions A, B, C, … and the compound sentences formed from them 
using the operators ~ (“not”), v (“or”) and & (“and”). This representation admits many 
compound propositions that are logically equivalent and thus, for our purposes, the same. For 
example, A & A, A v A, A & (Bv~B) are all logically equivalent to A. 
 The better representation is through Boolean algebras of different sizes. Their sizes are 
measured by the number of atoms, which is the number of logically incompatible, deductively 
strongest, non-contradictory propositions in the algebra. A three-atom algebra, with atoms a1, a2 
and a3, has just 8 logically distinct propositions: 
∅ (the contradiction) 
a1, a2, a3 
a1 v a2, a1 v a3, a2 v a3 
Ω3 = a1 v a2 v a3 (the universal proposition) 
The set of propositions over which inductive relations will be defined will include all such 
algebras with finitely many atoms: Ω2, Ω3, Ω4, … 
2.2	  Symmetries	  of	  the	  Boolean	  Algebra	  
 The deductive structure of a Boolean algebra is just the full set of all deductive 
entailment relations among the propositions, such as 
∅ entails a1 entails (a1 v a2) entails (Ω3 = a1 v a2 v a3) 
This deductive structure is highly symmetric. For example, the two atoms a1 and a2 enter into 
deductive relations that are perfect copies of another. Relations 
a1 entails a1 v a2 
a2 entails a2 v a3 
are two copies of the more general entailment relation 
(some atom) entails (some atom) v (some other atom) 
The two differ only in the choice of labels of the atoms. The general result is that the deductive 
structure is preserved under arbitrary relabeling of the atom. Such relabeling includes arbitrary 
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permutation of the atom labels. For more discussion of these symmetries, including pictorial 
representations, see Norton (2010, Section 3). 
3.	  Deductively	  Definable	  Logics	  of	  induction:	  The	  Formal	  Expression	  of	  
Completeness	  
3.1	  Strength	  of	  Inductive	  Support	  
 An inductive logic assigns inductive strengths “[A|B]” to pairs of propositions in a 
Boolean algebra, where this symbol represents the degree to which proposition A is inductively 
supported by proposition B. (On other possibilities, see Section 8.2.) What makes these 
quantities strengths is that we can say that one is stronger or weaker than another. More 
precisely, we assume that there is a partial order relation  ”≤” defined over all well-defined 
strengths.2 That is, the relation is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. So that non-trivial 
limits are possible, the set of strengths is also assumed to be dense.3 There are two extreme 
values. There is a unique maximum value when A entails B and4 B entails A, [A|B] = [A|A] = 
[Ω|Ω]. When B entails ~A, [A|B] has the unique minimum [A|B] = [∅|B] = [∅|Ω]. 
 If the rules that specify the values of these strengths are sufficiently unambiguous that 
computation of the strengths is mechanical, then we have a calculus of inductive inference. 
 Our concern is the completeness of the calculus, as described in Section 1. That is, we 
seek a calculus that draws only on the resources of the propositions within the algebra. These 
resources are restricted to the deductive relations among the propositions, that is, its deductive 
structure. External inductive content, that is, externally generated judgments of strengths of 
                                                
2 For some pairs of propositions, strengths may not be defined. For example P(A|∅) is undefined 
in probability theory. 
3 That is, for any strengths x and y such that x<y, there exists a z such that x<z<y. The relation 
x<y is defined as x≤y but not x=y. 
4 For a probabilistic logic, the condition that A entails B is superfluous. However it is required 
by other inductive logics, such as the “specific conditioning” logic of Norton (2010, §11.2; 2015, 
Part II). 
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inductive support, are excluded. Hence the condition of completeness is implemented by 
requiring that the rules specifying the strengths of support employ only the deductive structure of 
the algebra of propositions. Such an inductive logic is “deductively definable.” There are two 
modes of definition: explicit and implicit.5 
 The two types of definition below pertain to some fixed set of m propositions {A1, A2, 
…, Am}. This set is intended to be very large. It might consist, for example, of all the hypotheses 
of a science along with the propositions describing the evidence for the science. The set is 
embedded in a Boolean algebra of propositions. It is fixed in the sense that the set will remain 
unaltered while we enlarge the Boolean algebra by disjunctive refinements introduced in Section 
5.1. 
3.2	  Explicit	  Definition	  
 More traditional accounts of inductive logic tend to support explicit definition. The 
venerable enumerative induction has the universal affirmation “A: Every S is P.” inductively 
supported by the particular affirmation “I: Some S is P.” The relation of I supporting A is defined 
explicitly in terms of the deductive relations between the universal A and the particular I. 
Hempel’s (1965) satisfaction criterion of confirmation allows that P(a) & P(b) confirms  the 
universally quantified (x) P(x), since P(a) & P(b) is what Hempel calls the development of 
(x)P(x) with respect to the domain {a,b}. Once again, the confirmation relation is defined 
explicitly only in terms of deductive relations. 
 In comparison to the propositional logic, these last two examples employ respectively a 
weaker syllogistic logic and a stronger predicate logic. Simple hypothetico-deductive 
confirmation can be explicitly defined within a propositional logic: 
E hypothetico-deductively confirms H just in case H deductively entails E. 
or more elaborately 
E hypothetico-deductively confirms H with respect to auxiliaries B just in case H&B 
deductively entails E. 
                                                
5 This paper gives a more precise definition than provided in Norton (2010, §5) and extends it to 
include implicit definitions. 
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Simple hypothetico-deductive confirmation is generally regarded as too permissive. It is usually 
augmented with further conditions that may require that H be, in some sense, simple; or that H 
not just deductively entail E, but explain it. It may happen that these extra conditions can be 
made explicit enough for logical formulation; and that the algebra of propositions can be suitably 
expanded to express them.6 Then the augmented confirmation relation will still be deductively 
definable. 
 This suggests the following formulation for the explicit definition: 
Explicit definition of [Ai| Ak] for i,k = 1, …, m 
[Ai|Ak] = formula that mentions only the deductive relations among some set7 of 
propositions of the algebra {A1, A2, …, Am} and their deductive relations to the atoms of 
the algebra Ω. 
Since each proposition is formed as a disjunction of atoms, inductive strengths can be defined 
explicitly as a function of the number of atoms in the disjunction. (The symmetry theorem below 
will show that all explicit definitions reduce to such a function.) The simplest example is the 
classical definition of probability: 
[A|B] = #A&B/#B 
where #A&B is the number of atoms in the disjunction of atoms equivalent to A&B; and 
similarly for #B. 
                                                
6 Otherwise, we may not have a relation of support precise enough to be captured by a calculus. 
The defining of the relation may require further facts about explanation and simplicity that 
cannot be expressed within the algebra of proposition. Then the inductive logic is revealed at the 
start as incomplete, for these further facts lie beyond the inductive scrutiny of the inductive logic. 
7 Natural explicit definitions typically employ only the deductive relations among Ai and Ak and 
the atoms. The m-membered set of propositions is included for continuity of exposition with the 
implicit definition. Note that a set is not ordered, so that the numbering of the propositions in the 
set is arbitrary. 
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3.3	  Implicit	  Definition	  
 In more recent work, the degrees of support are introduced implicitly by the requirement 
that they satisfy some system of axioms. This suggests the following formulation for implicit 
definition. 
Implicit definition of [Ai| Ak] for i,k = 1, …, m 
 Sentences that mention only the strengths [Ai| Ak], for i, k = 1, …, m, for propositions of 
the algebra in the set  {A1, …, Am}, the deductive relations among A1, …, Am  and their 
deductive relations to the atoms of the algebra Ω. The sentences uniquely fix the strengths. 
Merely requiring conformity to commonly used axiom systems, such as that for the probability 
calculus, is insufficient to specify the strengths uniquely. So, typically, additional sentences will 
be required in the implicit definition in order to fix the strengths. These sentences will likely be 
specific to the particular inductive problem under investigation. 
 For example, an implicit definition of a probabilistic system of real-valued strengths of 
support might include, along with others, the following sentences: 
 … 
For all Ai, Aj and Ak where Ai&Aj = ∅, 
[AivAj| Ak] = [Ai| Ak] + [Aj| Ak]. 
For all Ai, Aj and Ak, where neither Ai nor Aj are ∅, 
[Ai&Aj| Ak] = [Ai|Aj&Ak]x[Aj| Ak].  
For all Ai, and Ak, if propositions Ai&Ak = ∅ and there are no Ar and As, 
where i≠r and s≠k, such that Ar entails Ai and As entails Ak 
then [Ai|Ω] = [Ak|Ω]. 
 … 
The first two sentences are familiar axioms of conditional probability and the third is a specific 
condition one might choose to assist in securing unique values of the inductive strengths. This 
particular one is an attempt to introduce a uniform prior probability. 
 The analysis that follows will depend upon a key common feature of both explicit and 
implicit definitions:  
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For a deductively definable logic of induction, for some set {A1, …, Am} of 
propositions in the algebra, the pairwise inductive strengths [Ai| Ak] (for i, k = 1, 
…, m) are determined uniquely by the deductive relations among the propositions 
A1, …, Am and their deductive relations with the atoms of the algebra. 
4.	  The	  Symmetry	  Theorem	  
4.1	  An	  Illustration	  
 Since the deductive structure is highly symmetric, the requirement of deductive 
definability places a powerful restriction on the strengths of inductive support: the inductive 
structure must inherit all the symmetries of the deductive structure. 
 Take the simple example of the two strengths 
[A|B] = [a1 | a1 v a2 v a3] and [A’|B’] = [a2 | a1 v a2 v a3] 
The deductive relations among A = a1 and B = a1 v a2 v a3 are the same as the deductive 
relations among A’ = a2 and B = B’ = a1 v a2 v a3. In each case we have the support a single 
atom accrues from a disjunction of three atoms that include the atom. The deductive relations 
between the atom and the disjunction are the same in each case. Hence, if we require that the 
strengths are deductively definable in terms of these particular deductive relations alone, then the 
strengths must be the same. 
 We can arrive at the same result by a more formal procedure. If we merely swap the 
labels “a1” and “a2” then  [A|B] = [a1 | a1 v a2 v a3] is mapped to [a2 | a2 v a1 v a3], which is 
 [a2 | a1 v a2 v a3] = [A’|B’] since a2 v a1 v a3 = a1 v a2 v a3. Since a relabeling of the atoms 
preserves deductive relations, the deductive relations between the two propositions in each of the 
strengths is the same. We have 
 [A|B] = [a1 | a1 v a2 v a3] = [a2 | a1 v a2 v a3] = [A’|B’] 
4.2	  The	  General	  Case	  
 We can now apply this same method to the general case. For the propositions {A1, …, 
Am} of the explicit or implicit definition above, the inductive strength [A1|A2] is fixed merely by 
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the atom counts of the 2m conjunctions of A1, …, Am and their negations. This fact can be 
expressed compactly as 
Symmetry Theorem. If the inductive strength [A1|A2] is deductively definable, 
either explicitly or implicitly, then there exists a function f of 2m integers such that 
 [A1|A2]= f(#A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am, … , #~A1&~A2& … &~Am-1&~Am) 
where #(proposition) denotes the number of atoms in the disjunction that forms the 
propositions.8 See Appendix A for the proof. I am calling an inductive logic based on a strength 
[A1|A2] a calculus if there is an explicit rule for mechanically computing the strengths. This 
function f provides that rule. Each distinct inductive calculus is defined by a distinct function f. 
Some of many possibilities are explored in Norton (2010). The most familiar is the classical 
definition of probability mentioned earlier, for which 
[A|B] = #A&B / (#A&B + #~A&B) = #A&B / #B 
Another possibility among many is a scale-free, “specific conditioning” logic for which 
[A|B] =  (#A&B / #B). (#A&B / #A) 
In this logic, the support from B for proposition A is reduced if a disjunctive part of A 
contradicts B. Conditional probability does not include such a penalty. 
5.	  Asymptotic	  Stability	  
5.1	  Illustrations	  
 A Boolean algebra ΩN of size N with atoms a1, a2, …, aN can be enlarged by replacing 
individual atoms by disjunctions of new atoms in a process here called “disjunctive refinement.” 
For example, we might introduce two new atoms, b1 and b2 through a1 = b1 v b2 to form a new 
algebra ΩN+1 of size N+1 with atoms b1, b2, a2, …, aN. 
 Sometimes the added expressive power of disjunctive refinement is not needed. Take the 
simple example of a die throw. The usual probabilistic analysis is captured by a six atom algebra 
with the equiprobable atoms “one,” “two,” …, “six” representing the outcomes. The algebra 
                                                
8 For example, if proposition A is a disjunction of three atoms a1 v a2 v a3, then #A = 3. 
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could be refined by adding information on whether the thrown die landed on the left hand side of 
the table (“left”) or the right (“right”). We could form a seven-atom algebra with atoms 
one & left, one & right, two, …, six 
However, since the outcome of a well-thrown die toss is independent of the side of the table on 
which the die lands, the disjunctive refinement will not affect the probabilities of the original six 
outcomes. 
 In other cases, the added expressive power will be important. Consider a dart thrown onto 
a square dartboard. We are interested in the probability that the dart lands in the largest circle 
that can be fitted into the square. Assuming a uniform distribution of probability over area, the 
probability of the dart landing inside the circle (“inside”) is P(inside) = π/4 = 0.785398… If we 
assume equiprobable atoms, we might approximate this by a ten atom algebra in which the two 
outcomes are represented by 
inside = a1 v a2 v … v a8      outside = a9 v a10 
Hence P(inside) = 0.8. We can come closer to the correct value by a tenfold refinement of each 
atom so that we have an algebra of one hundred atoms. Then we set 
inside = a1 v a2 v … v a79      outside = a80 v a81 v … v a100 
and we have P(inside) = 0.79. By continuing with these disjunctive refinements we can come 
arbitrarily close to the sought probability of P(inside) = π/4. 
5.2	  The	  General	  Condition	  
 In general, in a deductively definable logic, disjunctive refinements will lead to 
adjustments of the inductive strengths of support, for both explicit and implicit definitions 
include mention of deductive relations to the atoms; and disjunctive refinement alters the atoms. 
These adjustments can be important, as the dartboard example shows. The supposition of 
asymptotic stability is that eventually, under repeated disjunctive refinements, these adjustments 
of inductive strengths either stop completely or the strengths converge toward fixed values. 
These last values are the representation of the true strengths; the earlier values appearing in the 
process of convergence are merely approximations to them. We have: 
Asymptotic Stability Under Disjunctive Refinement 
For some fixed set of propositions {A1, …, Am} of the explicit or implicit 
definition of a deductively definable logic of induction, for each strength [Ai| Ak],  
 13 
i, k = 1, …, m, there exists a limiting value, possibly unique to that strength,  
[Ai| Ak]lim to which the strength converges under all possible disjunctive 
refinements of the algebra. In taking the limit, it is assumed that disjunctive 
refinement of each proposition can be continued indefinitely.9 
The sense of convergence is the obvious one: For any strengths V, V’, where V< [Ai| Ak]lim < 
V’, it is possible to carry out a disjunctive refinement on the algebra such that, in the refined 
algebra,  [Ai| Ak] satisfies V < [Ai| Ak] < V’ and remains so for all subsequent disjunctive 
refinements. 
 Informally, disjunctive refinements can enrich the expressive power of the algebra of 
propositions in ways essential to the inductive problem. However eventually all further 
disjunctive refinement becomes inductive hair-splitting that no longer affects the inductive 
strengths considered originally. 
 Why require asymptotic stability? Without it, there is no assurance that the strengths of 
inductive support defined among the propositions A1, …, Am have unique values. For the set 
may be embedded in many algebras of propositions and, in general in a deductively definable 
logic of induction, each embedding will yield a different set of strengths. It would be too strong 
to require that all embeddings yield the same strengths. A weaker way to deal with the problem 
is to require merely that the strengths stabilize when the algebras become very large. 
6.	  The	  No-­‐Go	  Result	  
 While deductive definability and asymptotic stability are individually desirable 
properties, the no-go result shows that their conjunction collapses all the logics to a trivial 
inductive logic with just one limiting strength of support. Section 6.1 illustrates the proof 
method. The result is given in Section 6.2 and the proof is provided in Appendix B. 
                                                
9 For propositions concerning continua, such as the case of the dartboard, the possibility of this 
indefinite continuation is automatic. For propositions concerning discrete properties, the 
indefinite continuation can be effected by artifices such as conjunctions with propositions 
concerning continua. 
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6.1	  Illustration:	  The	  Principle	  of	  Indifference.	  
 The idea behind the result is that a deductively definable logic of induction does not have 
the internal resources to know when disjunctive refinement should no longer alter the strengths 
of support. Take the case of two atoms, a1 and a2. From the symmetry theorem we have: 
[a1 | a1 v a2] = [a2 | a1 v a2] 
for each strength is schematically “[1 atom | 2 atoms]”. 
 We now confuse the logic by malicious refinements. First, we refine the atom a1 into 99 
disjunctive parts: 
a1 = b1 v b2 v … v b99 
The two strengths become: 
 [a1 | a1 v a2] = [b1 v b2 v … v b99 | b1 v b2 v … b99 v a2] 
vs  [a2 | b1 v b2 v … v b99 v a2] = [a2 | a1 v a2] 
That is, schematically, we have: 
“[99 atoms | 100 atoms]” vs “[1 atom | 100 atoms]” 
In a generic logic, we would expect this change in atoms counts to alter the strengths, most likely 
to  
[a1 | a1 v a2] > [a2 | a1 v a2] 
What makes the refinement malicious is that, instead of refining a1, we could refine a2 in exactly 
the same way 
a2 = c1 v c2 v … v c99 
Then by analogous reasoning we would end up with 
[a1 | a1 v a2] < [a2 | a1 v a2] 
This contradicts the outcome of the first refinement. 
 An inductive logic can protect itself from malicious refinements by flattening all strengths. 
For example, strengths that are schematically “[99 atoms | 100 atoms]” and “[1 atom | 100 
atoms]” would be set equal. But that is to trivialize the inductive logic. 
 The general no-go result below shows that this trivialization is unavoidable in deductively 
definable logics of induction. It shows that asymptotic stability requires the strengths of 
inductive support to converge under repeated disjunctive refinement to a single value. 
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 This illustration is an amplified version of a familiar problem. The “principle of 
indifference” is an unassailable truism of evidence that greatly troubles probabilistic logics. 
Keynes (1921, 41) named the principle and gave an illustration (p.44) of how its use causes 
trouble. After antipodean relabeling of Keynes’ place names, we suppose that our most refined 
possibilities for an Australasian is indifferently that the antipodean is 
a non-New Zealander or a New Zealander, 
The principle of indifference requires that we assign equal probability of 1/2 to each. If we 
disjunctively refine the possibilities so that a New Zealander is replaced by the logically 
equivalent (North Island New Zealander or South Island New Zealander), then we have three 
most refined possibilities over which we are indifferent: 
a non-New Zealander or a North Island New Zealander or a South Island New Zealander 
The principle of indifference now requires that we assign equal probabilities of 1/3 to each of 
these; and this new assignment contradicts the old probability assignment.10 
6.2	  The	  Result11	  
 The following is proved in Appendix B:  
No-Go. 
For a set of propositions {A1, …, Am} defined on finite Boolean algebras and for 
an inductive logic that is: 
(i) deductively definable in the sense of Section 3, 
(ii) asymptotically stable in the sense of Section 5, and 
(iii) continuous in the sense of Section B.3, 
                                                
10 Norton (2008) argues that the principle of indifference is an evidential truism and that a proper 
accommodation of it requires a non-probabilistic logic in which all these outcomes are assigned a 
single ignorance value “I.” 
11 This result was first presented in simpler form in Norton (2010, §6). The present version 
extends the notion of explicit definability, introduces implicit definability, introduces the notion 
of classes of deductive structures, introduces a notion of continuity and employs it. The older 
development erred in failing to recognize the need for a continuity condition. 
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all the well-defined12 inductive strengths [Ai| Ak], for i,k = 1,…, m, converge under 
disjunctive refinement to a single strength. This includes the maximum strength 
[Ω|Ω] and the minimum strength [∅|Ω]. 
That is, there is no inductive logic satisfying (i)-(iii) other than the trivial logic with one limiting 
inductive strength. Since deductive definability is a formal expression of completeness, the no-go 
result asserts that there is no non-trivial, asymptotically stable, continuous logic of induction that 
is complete. 
 The requirement of continuity can be dropped. The no-go result reverts to the less elegant 
result that all strengths in each of the classes of deductive structures defined in Appendix B.1 
converge to a single value unique to that class. This result still trivializes the inductive logic. 
 To get a sense of the import of this no-go result, note that the set of propositions {A1, …, 
Am} must be finite, but can be arbitrarily large. Let it be the totality of propositions in science, 
including all the propositions expressing evidence in science. The no-go result tells us that no 
inductive logic satisfying its conditions (i)-(iii) can affirm whether the propositions of science 
are individually well supported by the totality of evidence. 
7.	  Incompleteness	  
 The pessimistic conclusion of the last paragraph is far from the full story. There are 
successful calculi of inductive inference that have supplied numerous important insights into 
inductive inference. These applications of the calculi, however, have never been complete. Their 
application has always been supplemented by external inductive content, sometimes explicitly 
and more often tacitly. The no-go result shows that this supplement is necessary. 
 By external inductive content, I mean the introduction of inductive strengths of support 
that are not fixed by the deductive structure through the definitions of the inductive logic. In real 
examples, these strengths are grounded in judgments made outside the particular application at 
issue. The strengths appear within the application itself as stipulations. 
                                                
12 This allows for the possibility of a logic leaving certain strengths undefined, such as P(A|∅) in 
the probability calculus. 
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 Here are two examples to illustrate it. The most natural supplement is to specify on 
external grounds that the atoms of some chosen algebra a1, a2, …, aN are preferred in the sense 
that the strengths are to be distributed uniformly over them, so that [a1|Ω] = … = [aN|Ω], but that 
no such requirement is placed on the atoms that may result from a refinement of this algebra. For 
example, Norton (2010, §7) introduces inductively preferred refinements (“partitions”) to enable 
the definition of non-trivial logics of inductions. Their stipulation contradicts deductive 
definability, since the strengths can no longer be defined solely in terms of the deductive 
structure but must recognize the externally stipulated, preferred refinement. Hence the no-go 
result is blocked. 
 A second example is the introduction of “Solomonoff priors” into a probabilistic analysis 
(Solomonoff, 1964). These prior probabilities assign higher probability to algorithmically less 
complex hypotheses. The external inductive content derives from the assumption that the world 
is such that inductive preference ought to be given to such hypotheses. These higher probabilities 
appear within the ensuing probabilistic calculations as a stipulation.  
 In these and other cases, the needed, external inductive content should itself have proper 
inductive support. If that support is provided by computations that formally use the same 
inductive calculus, one might try to merge those computations into the original computation. One 
might hope that the resulting combined computation is inductively complete. However it cannot 
be, since the no-go result would then apply to the combined computation. At best, we can have 
separate analyses: the original computation and a distinct one that grounds the external inductive 
content that supplements the original computation. 
 The need for the results of one computation to be carried over to a second underscores 
that the one calculus cannot be all there is to inductive inference. We also need a separate vehicle 
to transport the results between the computations. That is, on the model of incompleteness in 
arithmetic, we need a meta-theory to govern the transporting. An example of such a meta-
principle is Lewis’ “principal principle” adapted to the present context. According to it the 
strength of support for some outcome is matched to the physical chance of its occurrence, where 
the physical chance is learned inductively in a different domain. 
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8.	  Unsuccessful	  Escapes	  
 Here are some ways one might try to escape the no-go result. 
8.1	  Enriching	  the	  Deductive	  	  Logic	  
 Might the no-go result be escaped if we use a richer logic? It is unlikely to help. Two 
properties must be present in the deductive logic if a no-go result of this type is to be derived. 
The logic must admit a deductive structure rich enough in symmetries for a version of the 
symmetry theorem to be derived; and the logic must admit disjunctive refinements. These 
features will remain in familiar enrichments. However the complications introduced by the 
enrichments may make the no-go result harder to see and more complicated to prove. 
 For example, if we move to infinite Boolean algebras, the deductive structure remains 
highly symmetric and the disjunctive refinements are still possible in the same way. However we 
now have added complications. If our logic seeks to impose a uniform additive measure over the 
atoms, there is no normalizable measure that is uniform over a countable infinity of atoms. We 
may seek to avoid these problems by introducing further complications, such as a denial of 
countable additivity. The analysis becomes harder, but the no-go result will persist. 
 If we move to a predicate logic, the circumstances are much the same. The symmetries 
remain and disjunctive refinements are still possible. We might, for example, disjunctively refine 
the logic’s predicates. A predicate A1(x) might be refined to B1(x) v … v BN(x). 
8.2	  Enrich	  the	  Inductive	  Logic	  
 The inductive logic of this paper takes a two-place function [H|E] as its basic quantity. 
What of a logic that employs a three-place function: [H|E,B], which we might interpret as the 
strength of inductive support of hypothesis H from evidence E with respect to background B? Or 
what of a four-place comparative function [H1, H2|E, B], which we might interpret as the relative 
inductive support of hypothesis H1 compared to hypothesis H2 from evidence E with respect to 
background B? 
 A review of the argumentation leading up to the no-go results shows that it makes little 
use of the restriction to a two-place function and that extended versions employing higher order 
functions could be developed with little change. 
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 The simplest case would be when the higher order functions are defined as functions of 
the two place function, such as [H|E,B] = F([H|E&B], [H|B]) for some function F. Then, the no-
go result extends automatically to the higher order functions. 
8.3	  Preferred	  Refinements	  and	  Preferred	  Languages	  
 We might try to escape the no-go result by disallowing arbitrary disjunctive refinements. 
We would then stipulate which refinement gives the algebra of propositions that must be used 
and how the propositions A1, …, Am are to be embedded in it. This algebra becomes our 
preferred language. This stipulation amounts to a violation of completeness. For it amounts to the 
designation of a preferred refinement, as described in Section 7, and this in turn amounts to the 
introduction of strengths of inductive support on the basis of external, inductive considerations. 
For example, we might stipulate an unrefinable six-atom algebra for a die problem. If the logic is 
deductively definable, this amounts to assuming equal support for each of the die’s six faces. 
8.4	  The	  Subjective	  Turn	  
 An initially promising approach is to follow the subjective Bayesians and conceive of 
conditional probabilities as degrees of belief, with the prior probabilities freely chosen, 
subjective opinions. This free choice of the prior probabilities breaks the symmetry essential to 
the derivation of the symmetry theorem of Section 4, thereby blocking the no-go result that 
derives from it. 
 This stratagem delays the problem but does not avoid it. Since the probabilities of the 
system include subjective opinion, there is no longer a direct connection to evidential warrant. 
The hope is that, as conditionalization on evidence proceeds, the stain of subjective opinion will 
“wash out” leaving behind pristine inductive support. This hope has been formalized in limit 
theorems that show convergence to the truth of initially divergent prior probabilities under 
continuing conditionalization on evidence, such as in Savage (1954, pp. 46-50). 
 The difficulty with these theorems is that there is a competing indelibility theorem. Take 
the ratio form of Bayes’ theorem 
€ 
P(H1 | E)
P(H2 | E)
=
P(E | H1)
P(E | H2 )
⋅
P(H1)
P(H2 )
 
Assume that the growing evidence favors H1 in the limit. Then, as the evidence accumulates and 
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the limit is approached, the likelihood ratio P(E|H1)/ P(E|H2) will continue to grow larger. We 
would expect a correspondingly large posterior ratio P(H1|E)/ P(H2|E) to reflect that stronger 
support of H1. However, since the ratio of priors P(H1)/ P(H2) is freely chosen, at any definite 
stage of the conditionalization, there will be choices unfavorable enough to H1 to force the ratio 
of posteriors to be arbitrarily small and thus to indicate lack of support of H1. For any fixed 
evidence, there will be a prior probability ratio that can return any nominated ratio of posteriors. 
 The difficulty is similar to that introduced by arbitrary disjunctive refinements for a logic 
of induction. Different choices of disjunctive refinement can drive the strengths of support in 
wildly different directions. The no-go result escapes the difficulty by reducing the inductive logic 
to a trivial logic. We could instead continue to use non-trivial logics of induction, however, if we 
introduce external inductive content and only permit disjunctive refinements that conform with 
it. 
 A quite similar escape is available to the subjective Bayesians. Instead of allowing 
arbitrary prior probabilities, they can require that the prior probabilities be chosen in some way 
that is reasonable or responsible, such as articulated by Shimony’s (1970, §3) “tempered” 
personalism. Presumably what makes these constraints reasonable is that they are responsive to 
further, external evidence. In both cases, the collapse into arbitrariness is avoided by external 
inductive content. In both cases, the price paid in avoiding the collapse is that the logics are not 
complete. 
 In a related approach, confirmation measures are introduced as functions of the subjective 
probabilities, such as in Fitelson (1999). For example the distance measure d(H,E|B) = 
P(H|E&B) – P(H|B) gives one measure of the degree of confirmation of hypothesis H from 
evidence E. These measures also fail to escape the no-go result. There are two modes of failure. 
 If the measure retains a dependency on the prior probabilities, as does the distance measure 
d(H,E|B) above, then it does not supply the sought strength of inductive support. It is an 
amalgam of strength of support and prior opinion. 
 If the measure is not dependent on the prior probability or some other external inductive 
content, then we have a strength of support that conforms with the framework of this paper. 
Therefore, some form of the no-go result will apply to it and its application cannot be both non-
trivial and complete. The best candidate for a measure independent of the prior probabilities is 
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the likelihood ratio L(H1, H2|E) = P(E|H1)/ P(E|H2), since likelihoods are often introduced 
objectively, such as through physical chances. Recent work by Gandenberger (manuscript) 
shows that this measure is beset by difficulties structurally quite similar to those raised by the 
principle of indifference for prior probabilities and thus close to the general difficulties raised in 
this paper. 
9.	  Conclusions	  
 What has been established here is that inductive inference cannot be captured in a 
complete inductive calculus. 
 The local import of this result is small. It does not preclude the local application of non-
trivial calculi of induction. However their successful applications will always require a 
supplement of further inductive content, external to the calculus and beyond the reach of its 
inductive scrutiny. The need for this supplement has been routinely misdiagnosed as a minor 
failing of a particular implementation. It is really an unavoidable outcome of incompleteness. 
 The global import is greater. It concerns the nature of inductive inference itself. We 
cannot conceive of it formally, as merely inference conforming to such and such a quantitative 
calculus, probabilistic or otherwise. For no such calculus can be complete. We need a different 
conception of the nature of inductive inference. Such a conception is supplied by the material 
theory of induction (Norton, 2003). Inductive inferences are not warranted by conformity with 
universally applicable formal schema. They are warranted by facts. 
Appendices	  
A.	  Proof	  of	  the	  Symmetry	  Theorem	  
 Consider any two of the propositions {A1, …, Am} of the explicit or implicit definition. 
Permute their labels so that the chosen two become A1 and A2. Now pick any other two and 
relabel all the propositions in the set so that they become B1 and B2 of B1, …, Bm. In a 
deductively definable logic, the two inductive strengths [A1|A2] and [B1|B2] will be equal if the 
deductive relations among A1 and A2 and the remaining propositions A3, …, Am and with the 
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algebra’s atoms are the same as those among B1 and B2 and the remaining propositions B3, …, 
Bm and with the algebra’s atoms. This sameness of deductive relations will obtain just in case 
there is a permutation of the labels of the atoms so that each of the A1, …, Am become the same 
disjunction of relabeled atoms as the B1, …, Bm are of the originally labeled atoms. 
 Finally, this permutation of the atom labels is possible just in case the following 2m atom 
count equalities obtain: 
#A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am = #B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm 
#~A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am = #~B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm 
 … 
#~A1&~A2& … &~Am-1&Am = #~B1&~B2& … &~Bm-1&Bm 
#~A1&~A2& … &~Am-1&~Am = #~B1&~B2& … &~Bm-1&~Bm 
where there is one equality for each of the 2m combinations of unnegated and negated 
propositions in the list of m propositions. 
 To see this, note that if A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am and B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm are 
disjunctions of the same number of atoms, the atoms in A1, …, Am can be relabeled so that they 
match the labels of B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm; and so on for the remaining 2m-1 conjunctions. 
Since the 2m conjunctions are exclusive, none of these mapping will conflict; and since the 2m 
conjunctions exhaust the algebra, the relabeling is a complete mapping of all the atoms back onto 
themselves.13 
B.	  Proof	  of	  the	  No-­‐Go	  Result	  
B.1	  Classes	  of	  Deductive	  Structures	  
 Take the fixed set of propositions {A1, …, Am} of the explicit or implicit definition of a 
deductively definable logic of induction. We investigate how the strengths [Ai| Ak] vary under 
arbitrary disjunctive refinement of the algebra. To track these variations, we categorize the 
                                                
13 A quick way to see these last claims is to draw a Venn diagram of an example and note that 
the 2m conjunctions correspond to the 2m smallest areas in the diagram. 
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strengths according to the deductive structure of the propositions {A1, …, Am}; that is, 
according to the full list of which propositions entail which propositions, which contradict which 
and which are logically compatible with which. That is: 
Classes of Deductive Structures. Strengths [Ai| Ak] and [Br| Bs] are drawn from the 
same class of deductive structures14 among propositions {A1, …, Am} and {B1, …, 
Bm} respectively just in case the logical relations among the Ai and Ak and the 
remaining propositions in the set are the same as the logical relations among the Br 
and Bs and the remaining propositions in the set. 
A convenient way of distinguishing the classes is to identify which of the conjunctions in the list 
of 2m conjunctions in the symmetry theorem above are ∅ and thus have zero atoms. 
 In the simplest case of a two proposition list, A, B, the classes include: A entails B (for 
which A&~B=∅); B entails A (for which ~A&B=∅); A and B are logically incompatible (for 
which A&B=∅); A and B are logically compatible and disjunctively exhaust the algebra (for 
which ~A&~B=∅); A and B are logically compatible but do not disjunctively exhaust the 
algebra (for which no conjunctions are ∅). 
 Thus membership of two sets of propositions in the same class is revealed when, under 
suitable relabeling of one of the sets, the two functions f defining the inductive strengths have 
zero values for corresponding arguments. 
B.2	  Dynamics	  under	  Disjunctive	  Refinement	  
 We now show that the strengths [A|B] and [C|D] must converge to the same limiting 
strengths if they are drawn from the same class of deductive structures. Consider the m(m-1) 
non-trivial15 strengths that can be defined using the propositions in the set {A1, …, Am}: 
                                                
14 This amount of deductive structure is less than the full deductive structure invoked in the 
definitions of deductively definable logics of induction, for the latter definitions include 
deductive relations with the atoms of the algebra. 
15 That is, we exclude [A1|A1], [A2|A2], …, which are equal by supposition. 
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[A1| A2], [A1| A3], …, [Am-1| Am]. If there are two strengths drawn from the same class of 
deductive structures here, then there are two relabelings of the propositions A1, …, Am such that 
the first strength is labeled [A1| A2] and the remaining propositions A3, …, Am; and the second 
strength is labeled [B1| B2] and the remaining propositions B3, …, Bm. Moreover, the relabelings 
have the following property. 
 Consider the conjunctions of propositions mentioned in the symmetry theorem. The 
distribution of null ∅ among them encodes the class of deductive structure. For example if A2, 
…  Am entails A1, then ~A1&A2& … &Am=∅. Therefore, correspondingly, we must have B2, 
…, Bm entails B1, so that ~B1&B2& … &Bm=∅. Hence the corresponding conjunctions of 
propositions will agree on which are the null ∅ members. That is 
A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am = ∅    iff    B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm = ∅ 
~A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am = ∅    iff    ~B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm = ∅ 
etc. 
It now follows that corresponding arguments in the function f for [A1|A2] and [B1|B2] agree in 
those conjunctions that have zero atoms counts and those which have non-zero atom counts.  
 Using this key fact, the evolution of these two strengths under disjunctive refinement is 
tracked in two stages: 
Stage 1. The algebra is disjunctively refined until the atom counts of the conjunctions of the 
propositions Ai in the refined algebra equal or exceed the corresponding atom counts in 
conjunctions of the propositions Bi in the unrefined algebra: 
(#A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am)refined ≥ (#B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm)unrefined 
 … 
(#~A1&~A2& … &~Am-1&~Am)refined ≥ #~B1&~B2& … &~Bm-1&~Bm)unrefined 
It is now possible to carry out a different refinement of the original algebra (labeled below as 
“refined*”) under which the above inequalities become equalities: 
(#A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am)refined = (#B1&B2& … &Bm-1&Bm)refined* 
 … 
(#~A1&~A2& … &~Am-1&~Am)refined = (#~B1&~B2& … &~Bm-1&~Bm)refined* 
It follows from the symmetry theorem of Section 4 that these two strengths are equal: 
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[A1|A2]refined = [B1|B2]refined* 
Stage 2. We now refine the algebra as extensively as is needed to drive the strength [A1|A2] 
towards its unique limiting value [A1|A2]lim. The assumption of asymptotic stability assures us 
that there is such a unique limit and that any strength [A1|A2] can be driven to converge to it by 
suitable selection of disjunctive refinements. 
 We also carry out the corresponding refinements* in association with the strength [B1|B2] 
so that the equalities of the atom counts of the conjunctions continue to hold. Hence the strength 
[B1|B2] is driven towards its unique limiting value [B1|B2]lim. By the symmetry theorem of 
Section 4, these two limits must agree: 
[A1|A2]lim = [B1|B2]lim 
Thus we have found that sufficient disjunctive refinement drives all inductive strengths 
associated with the same class of deductive structures towards the same limiting value, which 
may or may not be unique to that class. 
B.3	  Continuity	  
 The continuity condition for a deductively definable logic of induction is expressed in 
terms of the function f. Since f is not a function on the real numbers, but a function of natural 
numbers, the familiar notion of continuity for functions on the real numbers does not apply. A 
weaker notion is definable. Loosely speaking, it asserts that, for very large atom counts, 
differences in the absolute numbers of the atom counts become unimportant to the strengths and 
their effects can be made arbitrarily small. More precisely: 
Continuity in one argument. The function f of the symmetry theorem is continuous 
in the argument X: if V(X) = f(…, u, v, X, y, z, …) and V(X’) = f(…, u, v, X’, y, 
z,…), then V(X) approaches V(X’) in the limit in which X and X’ are held fixed 
and …, u, v, y, z, … each grow arbitrarily large, unless any of the … , u, v, y, z, … 
are 0, in which case they remain 0.16 
Continuity. The function f is continuous, if it is continuous in each of its arguments. 
                                                
16 If all the …, u, v, y, z, … are 0, we have a degenerate case of no interest in inductive logic. 
The condition of continuity places no restriction on the strengths. 
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The notion of limit in this definition is an obvious one: for any strengths V’<V’’, there exists 
variable values …, u*, v*, y*, z*, … such that for all …, u’>u*, v’>v*, y’>y*, z’>z*, … 
V’ < V(X) = f(…, u’, v’, X, y’, z’, …) < V’’ 
just in case we also have  
V’ < V(X’) = f(…, u’, v’, X’, y’, z’, …) < V’’ 
This notion of continuity is satisfied by typical functions f. In particular, it is satisfied by any 
function f whose value depends only on the ratios of the atoms counts, such as the f associated 
with classical probability: [A|B] = #A&B/#B. 
B.4	  Reduction	  to	  a	  Single	  Strength	  
 The analysis of the Section B.2 shows that the limiting values of the inductive strengths 
converge to a finite set, with one limit for each class of deductive structures of the set of 
propositions {A1, …, Am}. It will follow from the continuity condition that all these limits are 
the same. 
 The classes of deductive structures as a whole form a larger structure in which we can 
move step-wise from one class to another adjacent to it merely by setting one of the conjunctions 
in the symmetry theorem to ∅, or, conversely, unsetting it. The easiest entry point is the 
deductive structure in which none of the 2m conjunctions A1&A2& … &Am-1&Am,  … , 
~A1&~A2& … &~Am-1&~Am are ∅. This corresponds to each of the A1, …, Am being 
logically compatible with each other but not disjunctively exhaustive of the algebra. We then 
move to the other classes by setting repeatedly one or other of conjunctions to ∅. 
 For the case of {A, B, C}, we start with none of the 23 = 8 conjunctions A&B&C, …, 
~A&~B&~C being ∅: 
(a) If we set ~A&~B&~C=∅, then the propositions A, B and C are disjunctively 
exhaustive: AvBvC = Ω. 
(b) If we set A&~B&C=∅ and A&~B&~C=∅, then A&~B=∅ and A deductively 
entails B. 
(c) If in addition to (b) we set ~A&B&C=∅ and ~A&B&~C=∅, then ~A&B=∅ 
and B also deductively entails A. In this combined case, [A|B] = [A|A] = 
[Ω|Ω], the maximum strength. 
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(d) If we set A&B&C=∅ and A&B&~C=∅, then A&B=∅ and B contradicts A. In 
this case, [A|B] = [B|A] = [∅|Ω], the minimum strength. 
In this way, by sequentially setting one or other conjunction to ∅, we can visit all the deductive 
classes to which the strengths can belong, including the cases of maximum and minimum 
strength. 
 Consider two strengths [Ai| Ak] in {A1, …, Am} and [Br| Bs] in {B1, …, Bm}.  We shall 
say that they are drawn from adjacent classes if we can move one strength from its class to the 
other class merely by setting one of its non-null conjunctions to ∅. For concreteness, let us say 
in this case that, when we set one conjunction from the A-class to ∅, we move the strength 
[Ai|Ak] to the adjacent B-class as [Br| Bs]. That is, we can write the two strengths as: 
[Ai| Ak] = f(…, u, v, x, y, z, …) 
[Br| Bs] = f(…, u, v, 0, y, z, …) 
where  x>0 and the …, u, v, y, z, … are now limited to just those atom counts not already set to 
zero in the first class of deductive structures. 
 To see that these two strengths converge to the same limiting values under sufficient 
disjunctive refinement, pick any small interval of values bounded by V<V’. Because the logic is 
assumed continuous in the sense of the last section, there exists variable values …, u*, v*, y*, z*, 
… such that for all …, u’>u*, v’>v*, y’>y*, z’>z*, … 
V < [Ai| Ak] = f(…, u’, v’, X, y’, z’, …) < V’ 
just in case we also have  
V < [Br| Bs] = f(…, u’, v’, X’, y’, z’, …) < V’ 
 Since the interval bounded by V<V’ is arbitrary, it can be made arbitrarily small. It 
follows that [Ai| Ak] and [Br| Bs] approach the same limiting value under continuing disjunctive 
refinement:  
[Ai| Ak]lim = [Br| Bs] lim 
We have from Section B.2 that all strengths in one class of deductive structures converge to the 
same limit under disjunctive refinement. Therefore this last common limiting strength is the limit 
strength for the two classes from which [Ai| Ak] and [Br| Bs] are drawn. 
 Each of [Ai| Ak] and [Br| Bs] are chosen generally with the sole restriction that they are 
drawn from adjacent classes of deductive structures. Therefore we have the general result that 
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the limiting strengths for any pair of adjacent classes are the same. Finally, all the classes are 
connected with one another by a chain of classes, each of which is adjacent to the next. 
Therefore the limiting strengths for all classes are the same. This includes the cases in which the 
limiting strengths are the maximum [Ω|Ω] and the minimum [∅|Ω]. 
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